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COMPETITION LAW & POLICY IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN
OUTCOMES; EXPLORING POSSIBILITIES
AND LIMITS
UMUT AYDIN* AND TIM BÜTHE**
I
INTRODUCTION
More than one hundred and thirty countries or jurisdictions now have laws
that seek to safeguard and foster market competition.1 At a minimum, such
competition laws prohibit agreements among supposed competitors to fix prices,
divide markets, or in other ways avoid or undermine market competition.2 Often,
these laws go much further. Many additionally seek to constrain the exercise of
market power of monopolies and dominant firms in the market for a particular
good or service by authorizing regulatory interventions, at least when there is
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1. For a review of the literature and up-to-date analyses of the process of competition law diffusion,
see Umut Aydin, The International Diffusion of Competition Laws, Paper presented at the Instituto de
Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (June 19, 2015); Tim Büthe & Shahryar
Minhas, The Global Diffusion of Competition Laws: A Spatial Analysis, Paper presented at the 6th
Meeting of the UNCTAD Research Partnership Platform on Competition and Consumer Protection,
Geneva (July 2015) (on file with the authors).
2. In the U.S. tradition, laws prohibiting anti-competitive behavior (from cartels to the abuse of
dominance in a particular market) are also known as antitrust laws.
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evidence of an abuse of such market power. Many also require advance approval
of mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures by a public regulatory agency to
ensure that such transactions do not create monopolies or have other serious anticompetitive effects. A number of competition laws even establish a broader
competition policy that authorizes competition agencies to engage in advocacy
vis-à-vis society to establish a “culture” of competition—and vis-à-vis
government entities at the national or subnational level to raise awareness of
anti-competitive effects of laws, regulations, or administrative decisions and to
urge legislative, regulatory, and other executive bodies to achieve public policy
objectives in ways that are compatible with keeping markets competitive.
Many of today’s 130 plus competition law jurisdictions are newcomers—more
than two thirds of them enacted their first competition laws within the past
twenty-five years.3 Most of these new competition law jurisdictions are
developing countries, where conditions are hardly conducive to the successful
implementation of pro-market legislation. A large number of them are poor or
even very poor countries with few resources to support even the most promising
public policies. Most exhibit high levels of both economic and political inequality;
some still have autocratic regimes in which insiders use their political power to
extract economic rents by restricting market entry; others have leaders who for
their political survival depend upon the support of entrenched economic insiders.
These conditions ensure powerful opposition to the meaningful implementation
of any competition law. And many jurisdictions have enacted their first
competition law or established a regulatory agency for its implementation while
also attempting the difficult task of democratizing their political systems or
liberalizing their economies.
Additional challenges arise from economic structures or expectations, held
by elites and sometimes large parts of the population, that are antithetical to a
market economy: In many of the new competition law jurisdictions, the state
retains a large ownership stake in many industries or is still expected to guide
outputs and inputs of the private sector. Moreover, in a number of these
jurisdictions, corruption is rampant in the executive branch, and the judiciary is
far from independent, contributing to generally poor rule of law and limited
access to justice. And even before adding the regulation of market competition
to the tasks assigned to their public administrations, many of the recent
competition law adopters suffered from weak bureaucratic capacity.
Recent scholarship has called attention to many of these conditions. It has
advanced our understanding of the serious challenges they present to the
effectiveness of competition law and policy in developing countries.4

3. Büthe & Minhas, supra note 1. See also Tim Büthe & Cindy Cheng, The Effect of Competition
Law on Innovation: A Cross-National Statistical Analysis, in A STEP AHEAD: COMPETITION POLICY FOR
SHARED PROSPERITY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH 183–220 (Washington: World Bank & OECD,
Conference ed. 2016) (detailing the timing and the often unfavorable context of competition law
adoption).
4. See, e.g., ARMANDO E. RODRIGUEZ & ASHOK MENON, THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION POLICY:
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Some young competition jurisdictions in the developing world, however,
appear to have overcome these challenges. Though their records so far are short,
some agencies seem to have succeeded in building substantial analytical capacity
and establishing considerable autonomy. And in a number of cases, they appear
to have become highly effective in dismantling private and public barriers to
competition in their countries, contributing to development and other goals of
these societies.5
A suitably implemented competition law and policy holds much promise.
Competition is necessary for the tremendous potential benefits of a market
economy to be achieved—including economic growth and innovation that leads
to greater variety, increased quality, and/or lower price—and makes it more
likely that those benefits are widely shared. At the same time, empowering a
government agency to engage in highly consequential market intervention may
leave everyone worse off if those powers are abused or exercised incompetently.
So there is much at stake in understanding what makes competition law and
policy effective. The articles in this symposium seek to explain the variation in
trajectories after the initial adoption of a competition law, focusing on two
questions:
First, why has the adoption of a competition law and the establishment of a
competition agency succeeded in bringing into existence a regulatory agency with
substantial analytical capacity and considerable capability to dismantle private
and public barriers to competition in some countries, while in others it has largely
failed to do so?
Second, what are the conditions under which competition law and policy are
effective in contributing to broader goals, such as development, equality, or
economic and political liberalization?
Prior to exploring these questions, we first address in part II the meaning of
“success” and “effectiveness” for competition law and policy. This analysis
structures the subsequent review of the literature because both impediments and
conducive conditions are differentially harmful or helpful, depending on what we
take to be the goals of competition law and policy. Part III then examines
available explanations for variation in outcomes, summarizing what current
scholarship considers the most important impediments to the effective
implementation of competition law and policy in developing countries, but also
scrutinizing the severity of these impediments. Part IV considers factors that

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF ANTITRUST IN DEVELOPING AND REFORMING ECONOMIES (2010) (providing
an incisive study of the challenges presented by recent competition law policy developments); ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS: THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION LAW
(Michal S. Gal et al. eds., 2015); COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas K.
Cheng & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013).
5. See William Kovacic & Marianela Lopez-Galdos, Lifecycles of Competition Systems: Explaining
Variation in the Implementation of New Regimes 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016 for a brief
discussion of several successful cases (some also discussed in other articles in this symposium), as well as
a discussion of why it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the trajectory of a country’s competition
regime during the first twenty to twenty-five years.
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should make a competition policy more likely to succeed, focusing on conducive
domestic and international political conditions. It examines inter alia the
importance and limits of political independence of competition agencies—an
issue that is generally under-theorized in the existing literature. Here, we suggest
that “embedded autonomy” may be preferable to formalistic independence. Part
V provides a brief preview of the other essays in the symposium.
II
EFFECTIVENESS AND SUCCESS OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY:
WHAT IS IT? HOW CAN WE ASSESS IT?
What constitutes “success”—and conversely, what constitutes “failure”—in
the realm of competition law and policy? The answer to this question provides
the lens through which competition law and policy are assessed. Yet, empirical
work has tended to answer the question only implicitly, for instance by examining
whether measures of competition law and policy have a significant positive
impact on indicators of aggregate economic growth, inward foreign investment
flows, democracy, or corruption.6 Answering this important question only
implicitly (and sometimes driven by data availability), however, is neither
conceptually nor theoretically satisfying. Instead, answering the question
explicitly and deductively must start with the goals of competition law and policy.
A complete review of the long-standing debates over the proper goals of
competition law and policy is beyond the scope of this paper.7 But a
comprehensive review also is not necessary here. Instead, we begin by observing
that scholars of competition law and policy generally agree that its goals are to
foster competition whenever markets are used as an allocation mechanism8 and
to safeguard market competition against anti-competitive practices such as
cartels and collusion and against the abuse of market power.

6. See Serdar Dalkir, A Quantitative Evaluation of Effectiveness and Efficacy of Competition
Policies Across Countries, in 2 POLITICS TRIUMPHS ECONOMICS? POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMIC REGULATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
226 (Pradeep S. Mehta & Simon Evenett eds., 2009) (evaluating the effectiveness of competition laws by
their impact on a country’s score on the World Economic Forum’s domestic competition index and levels
of foreign direct investment inflows); Niels Petersen, Antitrust Law and the Promotion of Democracy and
Economic Growth, 9 COMPETITION L. & ECON. 593 (2013) (assessing the impact of competition laws on
levels of GDP per capita, economic growth and levels of democracy); Jerg Gutmann & Stefan Voigt,
Lending a Hand to the Invisible Hand? Assessing the Effects of Newly Enacted Competition Laws (Feb.
2014) (unpublished manuscript) (exploring the effects of competition laws on economic growth,
investment, total factor productivity, and perceived levels of corruption).
7. For a recent collection, capturing many facets of these debates, see THE MAKING OF
COMPETITION POLICY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES (Daniel A. Crane & Herbert Hovenkamp
eds., Oxford University Press 2013).
8. Many would add that the goals include promoting the use of markets over other modes of
allocation, but we consider this a theoretically separate question. We also note Schumpeter’s classic
insight that extreme levels of competition might eventually become detrimental rather than beneficial
for, for example, innovation. For a discussion, see Büthe & Cheng, supra note 3.
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But what does this mean concretely? What steps should be taken in pursuit
of these general goals and how might we measure whether those goals have been
achieved? Deriving specific operational objectives or measures of success from
the general goals of competition law and policy is difficult. Part of the difficulty
arises from the lack of a precise, widely agreed-upon definition of “market
competition,” even in economics, despite the centrality of the concept to that
discipline, which generally prides itself on its near-universally shared priors.9 We
therefore structure the discussion in the remainder of this part of the paper
around more specific operationalized objectives of competition law and policy,
namely: (a) efficiency, (b) human development, (c) private sector rivalry,
(d) rivalry vis-à-vis the state, (e) a distinctive “culture of competition,” and
(f) economic and political freedom.
A. Efficiency
Under the influence of the Chicago School and its strictly economic approach
to antitrust/competition law and policy, maximizing consumer welfare became in
the late 1970s and early 1980s the predominant operational goal of competition
law and policy in the United States—and, after some time and to a variable
extent, in many other countries, too.10 Consumer welfare as the ultimate,
rhetorically emphasized goal, however, quickly gave way to efficiency as the
actual operational goal.11 Efficiency as a proxy for consumer welfare simplifies
the required economic analysis, but can only be justified as long as the
assumption can be maintained that efficiency gains will be passed on to
consumers—sufficiently so that the expected efficiency gains for consumers will

9. See Stephen Martin, Globalization and the Natural Limits of Competition, in THE
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF COMPETITION 4, 5–11 (Manfred Neumann & Jürgen Weigand eds., 2d
ed. 2012) (documenting diverse definitions of competition in the economics literature, such as rivalry,
absence of barriers to entry and exit, as a selection mechanism, and as the absence of monopoly); Paul J.
McNulty, A Note on the History of Perfect Competition, 75 J. POL. ECON. 395 (Aug. 1967) (discussing the
difference—and fundamental incompatibility—between Adam Smith’s view of competition and the
definition of perfect competition developed and refined by nineteenth and twentieth century
economists); George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1 (Feb.
1957) (giving a historical account of the definition of competition, and arguing for the necessity of the
concept to evolve with economic theory); John Vickers, Concepts of Competition, 47 OXFORD ECON.
PAPERS 1, 3, 4–7 (Jan. 1995) (noting that competition has taken on various meanings and interpretations,
and discussing the historical development of the concept). The more readily understood notion of perfect
competition is too idealized to be analytically useful here, as it would render any deviation from an
economy of atomistic individuals impermissible, which would imply trying to prohibit or prevent all
institutionalized relationships between economic actors, even though such institutions are crucial for any
economy with a substantial division of labor, because they provide for stability and predictability beyond
individual transactions. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (Nov.
1937); VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
10. DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND GLOBALIZATION, 142
(2010).
11. This occurred already in the early works by Chicago School proponents, such as Robert H. Bork,
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. L. & ECON. ECONOMICS 7, 12, 30 (1966).
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more than outweigh the expected risk of consumer welfare losses.12 Efficiency as
an operational goal of competition policy therefore requires careful
consideration of whether and to what extent firms have incentives to pass on
their efficiency gains.13
Efficiency as the operational goal implies prioritizing punishing and
preventing the anti-competitive practices that cause the greatest efficiency losses.
It has been widely understood to call, above all, for antitrust enforcement against
cartels, especially price-fixing and market-allocating agreements among
ostensible competitors. Such anti-competitive agreements so clearly result in
efficiency losses that many countries’ competition laws make them per se
violations14 with a trend toward increased criminalization.15 Beyond antitrust
enforcement against clearly anti-competitive horizontal agreements, however,
efficiency as an operational goal requires often complex economic (and political–
economic) analyses to distinguish practices and transactions that should be
punished or prevented from practices and transactions that seem anticompetitive but might in fact yield efficiency gains.16
The Chicago School’s claim that efficiency maximization is, or should be, the
only legitimate operational goal of competition law and policy remains contested
in many countries17—including even the United States.18 The claim that efficiency
12. Efficiency gains usually accrue to producers, for example, from greater economies of scale in the
case of mergers. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925, 927, 929, 942–944 (Apr. 1979).
13. Strikingly, this need for considering the political–economic strategic incentives is still often
ignored in antitrust analyses, even though a reduction in market competition reduces exactly these
incentives—as readily shown by game theory, which has otherwise become a staple of competition
analysis.
14. Evidence that a cartel agreement existed is thus sufficient for finding participating companies in
violation of the law, without any need for an enforcement agency to provide an analysis of the economic
effects.
15. See Gregory C. Shaffer, Nathaniel H. Nesbitt & Spencer Weber Waller, Criminalizing Cartels:
A Global Trend?, in COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW 301, 302 (John Duns, Arlen Duke & Brendan
Sweeney eds., 2015).
16. Such analyses are required because efficiency as the goal of competition policy implies allowing
firms to invoke efficiency gains not only for, for example, vertical agreements with ambiguous welfare
effects (such as between a producer and a distributor or retailer), but also as a defense for transactions
that may appear prima facie anti-competitive, such as horizontal mergers. See David J. Gerber, Adapting
the Role of Economics in Competition Law: A Developing Country Dilemma, in ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS: THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION LAW
248, 251 (Michal S. Gal et al. eds., 2015).
17. This contestation has been documented inter alia by MAHER M. DABBAH, INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW, passim (2010); Gerber, supra note 16, at 205–269.
18. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT
THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 77, 79–80
(Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (criticizing the narrow view of efficiency adopted by the Chicago school for
supressing innovative challengers, and paradoxically stiffling efficiency); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H.
Lande, The Chicago School’s Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, Not Efficiency, in
HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 89 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (arguing that congressional intent and
recent case law point to protecting the welfare of consumers as the primary goal of antitrust, rather than
efficiency).
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gains should be generally available as a defense for anti-competitive structures or
practices is similarly contested. It is not necessary, however, to accept these
claims in order to accept efficiency maximization or efficiency gains as one
operational goal of competition law and policy.
Accepting increased efficiency as an operationalized goal of competition law
and policy implies that increases in production efficiency, allocation efficiency,
or dynamic efficiency can serve as measures of success—insofar as the increases
are attributable to competition law and policy.
B. Economic And Human Development
Many scholars and practitioners argue that increasing efficiency must not be
the only goal of competition law and policy—and that this goal might even be
misguided for relatively poor countries that are still in the early stages of
industrialization, maintain large agricultural sectors, and use few post-industrial
services. To be sure, protecting inefficient producers may only postpone painful
yet ultimately necessary adjustments at a potentially substantial loss in economic
welfare. Exposing inefficient producers to more efficient competitors without
limits or assistance, however, amounts to a kind of shock therapy that can cause
unnecessary losses of income and productivity—problems exacerbated by the
minimalist or entirely absent welfare states in many developing countries.19 Such
shock therapy can intensify poverty and inequality and may even reduce the
number of competitors to the point of reducing the overall level of competition
in the economy. Moreover, if it brings about massive socio-economic dislocation,
a purely efficiency-oriented policy risks undercutting the political support for
pro-market reforms, even if those reforms promise substantial long-term
benefits. Accordingly, a number of scholars argue that developing countries
should be free to use competition law and policy to pursue their varying economic
and non-economic developmental needs.20
Including economic growth and development among the goals of antitrust is
appealing, and all else equal, a developing country should surely implement its
competition laws in ways that foster rather than delay or impede development.
Growth and development as such, however, are usually too far removed from
specific policymaking decisions to yield operational guidance for competition
agencies.21 Moreover, aggregate economic growth as a measure of competition

19. See NITA RUDRA, GLOBALIZATION AND THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: WHO REALLY GETS HURT? (2008); Erik Wibbels, Dependency Revisited: International
Markets, Business Cycles, and Social Spending in the Developing World, 60 INT’L ORG. 433, 438, (2009)
(documenting the underveloped social safety net in many developing countries).
20. Some also point out that during the early decades of their competition laws, today’s
industrialized countries used those laws in pursuit of a wide variety of goals. See, e.g., Aditya
Bhattacharjea, Who Needs Antitrust? Or, Is Developing-Country Antitrust Different? A HistoricalComparative Analysis, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 52, 53 (D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas K.
Cheng & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013).
21. See Simon J. Evenett, Would Enforcing Competition Law Compromise Industrial Policy
Objectives?, in COMPETITION POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA 47 (Douglas H. Brooks & Simon J.
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policy success is problematic given the considerable uncertainty around any point
predictions from even sophisticated contemporary models of economic growth,
which would constitute the counterfactual no-competition-policy baseline against
which growth in the presence of competition policy would need to be assessed.22
We therefore turn to two more specific proposals for implementing a prodevelopment competition policy.
Bhattarcharjea, drawing on the broader notion of human (rather than “just”
economic) development, suggests that competition law enforcement and policy
in developing countries should focus on “sectors that directly impinge on the
well-being of the poor, in particular essential consumer goods, agriculture [and
its inputs] and health care.”23 And he argues that developing country agencies
should initially focus on disclosing and alleviating concrete local impediments to
the operation of competitive markets. Such a strategy is promising because it:
allows new agencies to build technical capacity by solving relatively tractable
problems; enables them to build popular support for competition policy through
actions that yield clear benefits for domestic market participants; and gives the
agency time to develop transgovernmental linkages with their counterparts in
other countries before going after the transnational cartels that often ruthlessly
target developing countries.24 These arguments suggest that the sectoral
composition and geographic distribution of implementation and enforcement
efforts may serve as initial measures of success, until it becomes possible to assess
whether reductions in local distortions and benefits for the poor are indeed
materializing.
Fox goes further, both in conceptualizing development as an operational goal
of competition policy and in suggesting specific foci for competition policy
implementation. Pointing out that severe inequalities in education and access to
capital create highly consequential barriers to entry, she suggests that a
competition policy that seeks to foster equality of opportunity to partake in the
market and share in its benefits must include measures to overcome such
inequality or at least its effects.25 From this perspective, competition law and
policy are successful if they contribute to actual increases in market participation
from previously marginalized or excluded segments of the population, and could

Evenett eds., 2005) (noting the difficulty of deriving policy guidance based on agreeing that competition
policies should be “pro-growth”).
22. See P.A.M. Jacobs & Simon van Norden, Why Are Initial Estimates of Productivity Growth So
Unreliable?, 47 J. MACROECONOMICS 200 (2016); V.V. Chari, Patrick J. Kehoe & Ellen R. McGrattan,
New Keynesian Models: Not Yet Useful for Policy Analysis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 14313, 2008).
23. See Bhattacharjea, supra note 20, at 53.
24. Id. at 61.
25. Eleanor M. Fox, Competition, Development, and Regional Integration: In Search of a
Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries, in COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL
INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 273, 275, 281–83, 285 (Josef Drexl, et al. eds., 2011).
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be considered at least partly successful to the extent that they measurably reduce
the barriers to entry.
C. Unleashing Rivalry In The Private Sector: Identifying Impediments And
Fostering Competition
Now consider “unleashing rivalry”26 in the market as an objective in itself.
This widely acknowledged goal of competition law and policy may be worth
pursuing even for a jurisdiction that lacks the enforcement capability to ensure
efficiency gains or a positive contribution to economic or human development in
each particular case.
Before a competition agency can try to punish or prevent anti-competitive
practices through law enforcement or other measures, it needs to identify or
detect such threats. This ability to identify impediments to market competition
should be treated as conceptually and practically distinct from the ability to
remove or reduce such impediments. As Nelson noted in his incisive comment on
Posner’s depiction of the Chicago School of antitrust thought: “[i]t may be easier
to identify warts than to perform surgery that does not leave scars or have other
nasty side effects.”27
Identifying impediments to market competition requires capacity building28
to allow the competition agency to undertake the necessary economic, legal, and
possibly political analyses. This capacity is crucial because merely undertaking
and publishing the market analyses and disclosing deficiencies in market
competition may go a long way toward unleashing rivalry in the private sector
before any resources have been devoted to competition law enforcement.29
Where information about profitable business opportunities is not readily
available, merely identifying industries where prices exceed competitive levels,
for instance, can unleash rivalry because it will encourage market entry by
economic agents seeking profitable opportunities.30 Where market entry is
prevented by seemingly prohibitive structural impediments—such as when
bottlenecks in the distribution network render an otherwise competitive industry
oligopolistic—explicitly identifying the barriers to entry encourages
technological or political innovation to overcome them.31 And where market
26. We borrow the term from the title of a 2009 report: COMPETITION TRIBUNAL SOUTH AFRICA
& COMPETITION COMMISSION SOUTH AFRICA, UNLEASHING RIVALRY: TEN YEARS OF
ENFORCEMENT BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMPETITION AUTHORITIES (2009), http://www.compcom
.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/10year.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5HJ-UDRF].
27. Richard R. Nelson, Comments on a Paper by Posner, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 952 (1979)
(cautioning that “this does not mean that a steady alert and occasional operation are not called for”).
28. See infra part IV, for further discussion of what such capacity building entails.
29. See infra part II.D for a discussion of policy priorities when market analyses identify laws,
regulations, or the actions of public bodies as the key impediments to competition.
30. The same logic applies, a fortiori, if a competition agency’s analyses can pin-point the specific
stage(s) of a given product’s value chain that are the main source of the supra-competitive prices.
31. In Kenya, for instance, large numbers of dairy farmers, including tens of thousands of
smallholder milk producers, should ensure a highly competitive market for milk and related products.
See, e.g., STELLA WAMBUGU, LILIAN KIRIMI, & JOSEPH OPIYO, PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS AND
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competition is thwarted by deliberate anti-competitive practices—such as when
a nationally dominant firm abuses and maintains its market power by threatening
price wars against any new market entrants—public disclosure might, like a
naming-and-shaming strategy, encourage self-correction, or at least discourage
others from engaging in similar anti-competitive conduct.
Accepting “unleashing rivalry” and hence the identification of impediments
as a fundamental operational goal of competition law and policy implies that
capacity building itself may initially be a sensible measure of a competition
policy’s success. But in line with Kovacic and Lopez-Galdos’s notion of
competition agency lifecycles, different metrics are required later.32 Once an
agency has attained the requisite analytical capacity, the actual conduct and
publication of analyses identifying impediments to market competition (and
estimating the material consequences) should serve as the measure of
effectiveness, particularly in an agency’s first decade or two. Only once such
practices are well-established would it seem reasonable to assess a competition
agency’s pursuit of unleashing rivalry by examining whether or not potential
market entrants actually enter the market when it is profitable to do so.
D. Unleashing Rivalry Vis-à-Vis The State: Changes In Law And Public Policy
As important as it is to unleash rivalry in the private sector, it is often “the
state [that most] harms competition,”33 including through its rules governing
markets, ad hoc policy decisions, preferential conditions for state-owned and
directed enterprises, and government-granted monopolies. And as Fox and
Healey point out, such problems are especially prevalent in developing
countries.34
Competition advocacy targeting anti-competitive laws and public policies is
increasingly recognized as a distinct but very important part of competition
policy.35 As defined by the International Competition Network, advocacy refers
PERFORMANCE OF DAIRY FARMING IN KENYA (2011). But milk processing facilities are few and far
between, creating a severe bottleneck in conjunction with technological constraints such as a lack of a
stable electricity supply in many rural areas and a transportation infrastructure that is sufficiently weak
that, for many farmers, only one processing facility is within realistic reach. Diederik de Boer & Jackson
Langat, Dairy Clustering in Kenya, in DIGGING DEEPER: INSIDE AFRICA’S AGRICULTURAL, FOOD AND
NUTRITIONAL DYNAMICS 113, 129, 131, 133 (2013). This has allowed three processors to dominate the
formal market for pasteurized milk. As a result, Kenyan consumers continue to pay substantially more
for pasteurized milk than consumers in neighboring countries even while the dominant processors have
pushed down the prices they pay to producers by twenty-five percent over the last few years. Muchemi
Wachira, Farmers Want Dairy Board to Set Prices of Raw Milk, BUS. DAILY AFR. (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Farmers-want-dairy-board-to-set-prices-of-rawmilk/-/539550/2224552/-/t5ls7sz/-/index.html [https://perma.cc/3S58-WG9V]
32. See generally Kovacic & Lopez-Galdos, supra note 5 (suggesting an agency’s effectiveness
should be measured using different metrics at different points in its “lifecycle”).
33. Eleanor M. Fox & Deborah Healey, When the State Harms Competition: The Role for
Competition Law, 79 ANTITRUST L. J. 769, 775–95 (2014).
34. Id.
35. Marco Botta, Does the EU Competition Law Model Satisfy the Needs of the Emerging
Economies? Lessons from the Countries Without a “Carrot”, in FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC
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to “activities conducted by the competition agency related to the promotion of a
competitive environment by means of non-enforcement mechanisms, mainly
through its relationships with other governmental entities and by increasing
public awareness of the benefits of competition.”36 In developing countries,
advocacy vis-à-vis legislatures and parts of the executive branch with rulemaking
or market-regulating powers should therefore be particularly important.
Accepting the importance of advocacy vis-à-vis the state or governmental
bodies as a key element of competition policy in developing countries implies
that the conduct of well-prepared advocacy work targeting public actors might
already be considered an indication of agency success. In fact, during a
competition regime’s initial stages, if its competition law originally did not permit
advocacy, the mere incorporation of provisions allowing or prescribing advocacy
work—or the legislature’s decision to allocate additional resources for
advocacy—may initially serve as a measure of success. Once an agency is well
established, success should be measured according to the actual reduction of
governmental impediments to market competition.37
E. Fostering a Culture Of Competition
There are no markets in the Hobbesian “state of nature” where clubs are
trumps.38 Markets in which arm’s-length, voluntary transactions coordinate
behavior well enough to foster sustained economic development require a dense
web of supportive formal and informal social institutions. Such institutions
usually take a long time to develop39—an insight that underpins Rodriguez and
Menon’s argument for why even well-implemented antitrust laws are likely to fail
in many developing countries.40 Among those supportive social institutions is
arguably a “culture of competition,” which, following the ordo-liberal idea that

DEVELOPMENT IN EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS 2251, 2262 (Karolina Podstawa & Laura Puccio eds.,
2012); William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition
Economies, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 403, 450 (1997); William E. Kovacic, The Role of Non-Litigation
Strategies: Advocacy, Reports and Studies as Instruments of Competition Policy, in HANDBOOK OF
RESEARCH IN TRANS-ATLANTIC ANTITRUST 541, 542 (Philip Marsden ed., 2006); Armando E.
Rodriguez & Malcolm B. Coate, Competition Poliy in Transition Economies: The Role of Competition
Advocacy, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 365, 367–69 (1997).
36. ADVOCACY WORKING GROUP, ADVOCACY AND COMPETITION POLICY 25 (2002), http://www.
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc358.pdf [https://perma.cc/23ZN-8URS].
37. Keeping in mind that the appropriate counterfactual for assessing any reduction should be the
level of such impediments that would have been observed in the absence of competition advocacy which
may or may not be a situation we actually get to observe.
38. See THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE (1642); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651) (introducing his
notion of the state of nature).
39. See generally JERRY F. HOUGH & ROBIN GRIER, THE LONG PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT:
BUILDING MARKETS AND STATES IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND, SPAIN, AND THEIR COLONIES
(2015).
40. See generally A.E. Rodriguez & Ashok Menon, The Causes of Competition Agency
Ineffectiveness in Developing Countries, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016.
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competition is foundational to a market economy, may be defined as a broadbased consensus that competition is both generally beneficial and normatively
desirable.41
Historical analyses of the development of EU competition law and policy
often emphasize the fostering of such a culture of competition as one of the EU
Commission’s most important contributions to reducing pervasive cartelization
and collusion.42 U.S. regulators and private sector practitioners with a long time
horizon similarly tend to mention creating and maintaining such a culture as an
important contribution of U.S. antitrust law and policy.43 To be sure, the
European Commission’s ability to foster a competition culture in local business
communities might have depended upon local legal institutions and bureaucratic
capacity that are lacking in many developing countries.44 But such practical
impediments, discussed in part III below, do not invalidate the goal.
As a practical matter, accepting fostering a culture of competition as a goal of
competition law and policy implies engaging in advocacy targeted towards the
society at large. It may also call for at least a minimum level of actual enforcement
to signal that the rules are meaningful.
In the early years of a new competition regime, merely engaging in targeted
and appropriate advocacy might be considered a sign of success. But ultimately,
changes in the expectations of, and normative dispositions toward, market
competition, if they can be attributed to the competition authority’s efforts,
should be the key measure of success in creating a culture of competition.
F. Economic And Political Freedom
Economic resources can almost always be used to gain influence—in the
market and beyond. It is therefore hardly surprising that the inherently political
character of highly concentrated economic power has been central to debates
over competition law and policy from the beginning. That high concentrations of
economic power are inimical to economic and political freedom was a prominent
theme in Senate debates over the bills that eventually became the U.S. Sherman

41. See FRANZ BÖHM, WALTER EUCKEN & HANS GROSSMAN-DOERTH, THE ORDO MANIFESTO
OF 1936 (1936), reprinted in THE MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES
254, 265 (Daniel A. Crane & Herbert Hovenkamp eds., 2013) (arguing for the centrality of competition
to a market economy, not just for achieving economic efficiency but also for preserving economic and
political freedom).
42. See, e.g., Stephen Wilks, Agencies, Networks, Discourses and the Trajectory of European
Competition Enforcement. 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 415 (2007) (arguing that the development of a
competition culture has been a crucial component of the success of the European Commission and the
European Competition Network).
43. Author’s not for attribution interviews, in Washington, DC (Mar. 27, 2015). See also TONY A.
FREYER, REGULATING BIG BUSINESS: ANTITRUST IN GREAT BRITIAN AND AMERICA, 1880–1990
(1992) (arguing that antitrust emerged as a response to the rise of big business, yet also became a political
and cultural value shaping business strategies and culture in the United States and Great Britain).
44. See Josef Drexl, Economic Integration and Competition Law in Developing Countries, in
COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 231, 243–46 (Josef
Drexl, et al. eds., 2011).
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Act of 1890.45 Moreover, as most explicitly articulated by ordo-liberal
competition law and policy scholars and practitioners,46 if economic power is
political power, some restrictions on market concentration may be of
fundamental importance for the compatibility of political democracy and a
market economy.47
Safeguarding economic and political freedom as an operational goal has not
received much attention in the literature on competition law and policy in
developing countries, but may be particularly pertinent because many of them
have only quite recently made the transition to democracy. It underscores the
continued importance of (some) structuralist market analysis and suggests that
competition policy may need to be attentive to the broader contextual factors
that affect the extent and ease with which economic power can be transformed
into political power.
Table 1.1 summarizes the discussion above. It serves as a basis for thinking
more systematically about both well-known and less-analyzed impediments to
effectiveness and success, further discussed in part III.

45. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES,
PART I: THE ANTITRUST LAWS 61–364 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1978) (“This bill is a step in the right
direction, and if it shall the beginning of the end of this system of conspiracies and combinations it will
be hailed as the dawn of genuine freedom, and if it is not so constructed as to accomplish this purpose, I
hope that the Senate will so amend it as to make it effective” (p. 77 (citing 20 CONG. REC. S3458
(statement of Sen. Jones))); “If the concentered [sic] powers of this combination are intrusted [sic] to a
single man, it is a kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of government, and should be subject to
the strong resistance of the State and national authorities” (p. 117 (citing 21 Cong. Rec. S2457 (statement
of Sen. Sherman)))).
46. See, e.g., FRANZ BÖHM, COMPETITION AND THE FIGHT AGAINST MONOPOLIES: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE LEGAL RIGHT TO ECONOMIC CONTESTATION AND OF THE LEGAL
UNDERPINNINGS OF THE CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC ORDER (1933); Franz Böhm, Democracy and
Economic Power, in CARTEL AND MONOPOLY IN MODERN LAW: REPORTS ON SUPRANATIONAL AND
NATIONAL EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN LAW 25 (1961); WALTER EUCKEN, ECONOMIC POWER AND
ECONOMIC ORDER: EUCKEN’S LONDON LECTURES ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND TWO ESSAYS ON
ANTI-MONOPOLY POLICY (2001).
47. See Alexander A. Kirshner, Legitimate Opposition, Ostracism, and the Law of Democracy in
Ancient Athens, 78 J. POL. 1094, 1097–1101 (2015) (discussing the Ancient Athenian practice of ostracism,
which Kirshner categorizes as an “anti-monopolistic” institution, introduced as part of the Kleisthenic
reform to safeguard Athenian democracy and repeatedly used against citizens who, having amassed a
“kingly fortune” in Athens’ market economy, were seen by the citizens as a threat to democratic
governance; ostracism was the practice of banning a person from the city state for ten years based on an
annual ballot). See also Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646–648 (Feb. 1998) (drawing parallels between
competitive markets and democratic politics, and arguing for judicial intervention when dominant
political parties adopt measures to entrench their position, like dominant firms in markets).
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Table 1.1
Defining and Measuring Competition Policy Success
Operational Goal
Efficiency

Development:
Economic & Beyond

Implementation (Policy Priorities)
• Antitrust enforcement against
(punishment and prevention of) anticompetitive practices that cause clear
and substantial efficiency losses
• Implementation guided primarily by
economic analysis
• Targeting competition law
enforcement/policy for maximum
potential benefits to the poor
• Targeting local distortions of market
competition
• Addressing inequality as impediment
to market entry

Unleashing Rivalry
in the Private Sector

• Building market-analytical
capabilities for identifying
impediments to competition in the
private sector

Unleashing Rivalry
vis-a-vis the State

• Competition advocacy targeting
legislative bodies and the parts of the
executive branch with rulemaking or
market-regulating powers

Unleashing a Culture
of Competition

• Advocacy vis-à-vis the business
community and society at large

Economic & Political
Freedom

• Attentiveness to political–legal
institutional determinants of the
political usability of economic power
• Conditional on such usability:
Structural analysis of market
concentration and economic power
(irrespective of “abuse” thereof)

Possible Measures of
Effectiveness and Success*
• Increases in production efficiency
• Increases in allocation efficiency
• Increases in dynamic efficiency

• Sectoral and/or geographic focus
of competition law/policy
implementation
• Reduction in local distortions and
actual benefits for poor and
previously excluded/marginalized
• Long-term: Improved capacity for
market entry by indigenous
entrepreneurs
• Capacity building as such (initially)
• Long-term: Identifying and
publicizing impediments to market
competition, incl. anti-competitive
structures and behavior
• Legislative authorization and
funding for advocacy work vis-àvis state or governmental bodies
(initially)
• Advocacy work targeting state or
governmental bodies (initially)
• Long-term: Reduction of
unnecessary government
impediments to market
competition
• Conduct of suitable advocacy work
targeting economic actors and
society at large (initially)
• Long-term: Changes in social
expectations and normative
disposition toward market
competition
• Sensitivity to conditional effect of
market structure on political
(in)equality (initially)
• Long-term: Freedom from private
economic power
maintained/expanded
• Long-term: Nominal political-legal
equality remains de facto
meaningful

* All outcome measures are to be read as “… if attributable to competition law and policy,”
which as a practical matter at a minimum implies: above and beyond increases/decreases that would
be achieved in the absence of competition law and policy.
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III
EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN OUTCOMES (1):
IMPEDIMENTS TO COMPETITION POLICY EFFECTIVENESS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The existing literature identifies many obstacles to the effective
implementation of competition law and policy in developing countries. Such
obstacles can be grouped into five categories. We specify how each of these
common conditions of developing countries is said to interfere with the success
of competition law and policy, especially in relation to the operational goals of
competition policy discussed in part II.
A. Resource Constraints
The most commonly noted characteristic of developing countries’
competition policies is a shortage of resources on three levels: financial resources
for the competition agency; legal and economic expertise within the
implementation/enforcement agency; and antitrust and economic expertise
within the judiciary. These resource constraints affect a competition agency’s
ability to pursue or achieve all six of the goals identified in part II, though most
severely the pursuit of efficiency due to its greater reliance on sophisticated
economic analyses and law enforcement. It may be possible, however, to
overcome these constraints in a number of respects.
1. Financial Resources
Staff salaries usually constitute a competition agency’s greatest expenditure
(followed by the costs of administrative support and information technology
equipment).48 A shortage of financial resources thus translates to a shortage of
staff and inability to hire additional, specialized outside experts. This affects the
agency’s ability to pursue any of the previously identified goals by undermining
its ability to carry out the legal, economic, and political analyses that are required
if the agency is pursuing an efficiency-maximizing competition policy, trying to
target competition policy such that it is maximally supportive of the country’s
development needs, or seeking to identify public and private impediments to
market competition. Lack of financial resources also constrains an agency’s
ability to engage in advocacy work to foster a culture of competition. While all
possible goals are thus affected by financial resource constraints, enforcementfocused approaches should be particularly severely hampered because of the
additional costs of on-site investigations and staff-intensive trial preparation and
performance.49

48. See Glob. Competition Rev., Rating Enforcement 2016, Analysis: Part 2, GLOB. COMPETITION
REV. (2016), http://globalcompetitionreview.com/surveys/article/41412/analysis-part-2 [https://perma.cc/
6FKA-79BH] (showing that out of thirty-nine competition agencies surveyed, thirty allocate more than
fifty percent of their budget to staff salaries, and fourteen allocate seventy-five percent or more of their
budget on salaries).
49. See Michal S. Gal & Eleanor M. Fox, Drafting Competition Law for Developing Jurisdictions:
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2. Expertise in the Agency
Shortage of expertise, particularly of well-trained competition lawyers and
economists, impedes both an agency’s ability to appropriately prioritize its
activities and to enforce its laws and policies. As Gerber points out, this problem
becomes even more acute when competition agencies choose a more economicsbased approach to competition law, that is, when they pursue an efficiencymaximization goal. The sophisticated models needed for evaluating anticompetitive conduct and the stringent data requirements for the pursuit of
efficiency require higher computational and staff resources.50
3. Expertise in the Judiciary
For enforcement-focused competition regimes in which the agency must
bring and win its cases before a judge, the judiciary’s lack of familiarity—not just
with antitrust economics but also with the often recently adopted competition
law—can be a very serious problem. In Mexico, for instance, the lack of expertise
in the courts crippled early years of competition policy enforcement when district
judges reversed agency decisions in several crucial cases.51 In Chile, the Supreme
Court used its broad powers of review to decrease fines imposed by the
competition agency, in one case to less than $100.52 Furthermore, a lack of
expertise in the judiciary can cause broader problems, such as an excessive
backlog of cases that renders judicial review of competition agency decisions
meaningless. Such delays enable anti-competitive actors to avoid judgments by
utilizing the slow-moving appeals process. In Turkey, for example, delays of up
to four years in the judicial review process often rendered the agency-imposed
fines negligible due to high inflation rates.53
In sum, resource constraints are a real problem. Competition agencies in
developing countries frequently have staffs so small that it is literally impossible
for them to carry out all of their assigned tasks.54 However, developing country
agencies may be less unique in this regard than they seem. Few, if any,
competition agencies have come to life fully formed and well-resourced. The EU
Learning from Experience, in ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS: THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION LAW 296, 311–314 (Michal S. Gal et al., eds., 2015) (discussing the
implications of human and financial resource shortages for the enforcement of competition law in
developing countries); Michal S. Gal, When the Going Gets Tight: Institutional Solutions When Antitrust
Enforcement Resources Are Scarce, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 417, 423–425 (2010) (describing the implications
of resource scarcity on the enforcement of competition law, and discussing possible solutions).
50. Gerber, supra note 16, at 253.
51. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN MEXICO: AN
OECD PEER REVIEW 45 (2004).
52. Javier Tapia & Santiago Montt, Judicial Scrutiny and Competition Authorities, in THE GLOBAL
LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW 141, 155 (D. Daniel Sokol & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2012).
53. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., TURKEY – PEER REVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW
AND POLICY 41–42 (2005), http://www.oecd.org/turkey/34645128.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY74-EHN6].
54. See, e.g., Keabetswe Newel, Competition Authority is Understaffed, BUS. WKLY. & REV. (Nov.
3, 2015), http://www.businessweekly.co.bw/competition-authority-is-understaffed/ [https://perma.cc/
7F7Y-DG2C] (discussing the impact of staff shortages on Botswanian Competition Authority’s
enforcement efforts).
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Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (originally DG IV)
illustrates this point well. When first set up—amidst considerable skepticism even
among those member states who had supported the treaty provisions for a
supranational competition policy—DG IV had a pitifully small staff. It had no
meaningful resources beyond the intellectual firepower of the individuals who
applied for the low-rank, low-prestige positions, mostly out of intrinsic
commitment but with little prior experience, since none of the member states had
meaningful competition law enforcement agencies at the national level prior to
1957. For the first several years, DG IV mostly just conducted market analyses
to gain the analytical and practical experience needed for its later enforcement
work. It also built a constituency by making impediments clearly known to
market participants who could benefit from their removal. And it alerted these
constituents to the availability of EU-level competition law and policy as a means
of seeking redress.55
The EU experience suggests that capacity can (and maybe must) be built
internally. It also highlights the issue of sequencing, a central component of
Kovacic and Lopez-Galdos’s argument that an assessment of the trajectory of a
competition agency is only possible after twenty to twenty-five years. The
capacity (and political support) for market analysis, advocacy, and law
enforcement must first be built, preferably in that order, and then rendered
independent of the charisma of a founding head of the agency, before the
sustainability of an agency’s success can adequately be evaluated.56
Matching tasks to available resources can make capacity-building more
successful. Newly established agencies should, for instance, avoid requiring
notification and review of all mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures, no matter
how small. Though sweeping notification requirements may be attractive because
they usually generate fee income, they can also overwhelm the agency with the
processing of paperwork alone, leaving no time for analysis and capacitybuilding. Even when the aspirations of an agency, as written into the authorizing
law and implementing regulations, are not matched by budgetary allocations, the
agency can still recover much ground by effectively setting its own priorities.
Competition agency experts from developing countries as diverse as Jamaica,
Egypt, Kenya, and Thailand, for instance, have emphasized the need to balance
vigorous competition law enforcement with the allocation of scarce resources and
skilled personnel to other pressing policy problems.57

55. For details, see Tim Büthe & Gabriel T. Swank, The Politics of Antitrust and Merger Review in
the European Union: Institutional Change and Decisions from Messina to 2004 (Harv. Ctr. for Eur. Stud.,
Working Paper No. 142, Dec. 2006).
56. See Kovacic & Lopez-Galdos, supra note 5, at 94–97.
57. See Frank Emmert, Franz Kronthaler & Johannes Stephan, Analysis of Statements Made in
Favour of and Against the Adoption of Competition Law in Developing and Transition Economies,
HALLE INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG, SONDERHEFT 45, 56 (2005).
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Moreover, attrition of skilled staff to the private sector is an even greater
concern in developing countries than it is in advanced industrialized countries.
Each year between 2005 and 2015, South Africa’s Competition Commission lost
more than 18% of its staff on average; the Mexican Federal Competition
Commission 20%; and the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service more than
24%.58 Training and integrating new recruits can be a significant burden on an
agency’s financial and human resources—if the developing country’s competition
agency is able to replace the lost staff at all. Yet, though attrition can be a real
problem in the short run, it may be better to view, and more palatable to defend,
such lost training and manpower as positive spill-over from a public investment
to the larger economy: if agency training in competition law and policy creates
transferable skills, it may also earn political support for the agency’s work.
Finally, even generous funding and staffing do not guarantee success.
“Effectiveness gaps”—where an agency performs below the expected degree of
effectiveness given their level of funding and expertise—are widespread.59
Sometimes, other impediments may be so severe that even a well-funded and
well-staffed agency cannot make a big difference. More often, however, it seems
that an unwise use of resources (for political expediency or due to inattention to
building capacity) explains those effectiveness gaps.
B. Unsupportive Or Hostile Political–Legal Environment
A second set of obstacles to effective competition policy enforcement in many
developing countries is political–legal in nature. We begin with impediments
rooted in the legal and judicial system, then turn to impediments attributable to
the broader political environment.
Many of the developing countries that have adopted competition laws in the
last twenty-five to thirty years are characterized by weak rule of law and low
judicial independence. These challenges are often exacerbated by restricted
“access to justice”60 for those who are not already socio-economically privileged;
and small businesses as well as potential market entrants are often among the
marginalized. Such conditions are a significant problem for the enforcementfocused competition policy in pursuit of economic efficiency (whereas they do
not have a deductively clear effect on the pursuit of the other objectives of
competition policy, discussed in part II above): The judiciary usually plays an
important role as the final arbiter in the enforcement of competition law, even in
systems where the initial steps in enforcement take place as an administrative
process within the competition agency. Conditions limiting access to the judiciary
58. Authors’ calculations, based on Rating Enforcement 2005–2015, GLOB. COMPETITION REV.
(2005–2015), http://globalcompetitionreview.com/surveys/archive. For comparison, the average for the
same period was fourteen percent for the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and five
percent for Germany’s Cartel Office (and a higher percentage of these departures were due to retirement
compared to the developing countries).
59. Dalkir, supra note 6, at 238–244.
60. See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX (2015), http://worldjustice
project.org/rule-of-law-index [https://perma.cc/MRH9-M6TE].
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therefore inhibit the likelihood that competition law will be effective in achieving
socially desirable outcomes. And often-pervasive corruption exacerbates the
problem by creating uncertainty about the impartiality of competition law
enforcement whenever suspicion of corruption extends to the judiciary or the
competition agency.
Autocratic regimes, weak democracies, and generally high political inequality
are also common among younger competition regimes. Autocratic regimes in
particular are often sustained by a close alliance between entrenched economic
elites in oligopolistic industries and a small group of political insiders. The former
may be partly a creation of the latter, such as when members of the autocratic
elite or the armed forces create monopolies and oligopolies in order to
(re)distribute a larger share of the national income to themselves than they could
obtain with competitive markets. In weak democracies, diffuse economic
interests, such as the interests of consumers, also tend to be poorly represented
or altogether marginalized.61 These inequalities increase the risk of political
interference in the implementation of the country’s competition law and policy
in the interest of firms with privileged access to political leaders. And firms with
market power or exceptional economic resources due to their anti-competitive
practices are among the most likely to have privileged access.
Having an unsupportive or even hostile political–legal environment is very
likely to undermine enforcement-focused, efficiency-maximizing competition
policies. But severe political inequality can also affect the ability to advance
development objectives, foster rivalry in an underdeveloped private sector, or
advance economic freedom through competition policy. These objectives require
an ability to target competition law and policy to the detriment of insiders,
making it very likely that those insiders will attempt interference. Advocating
competition-compatible public policies is also less likely to be successful under
conditions of high political inequality, because entrenched interests will likely
pressure legislators or government bodies to prevent changes in laws and policies
that generate rents for those entrenched interests.62
In sum, political–legal factors affect the ability of competition law and policy
to achieve many of its possible goals, possibly severely. To be sure, one might
argue that the possibility of political intervention is simply an additional reason
to call for the adoption of a competition policy with a strong advocacy role (visà-vis both public actors and civil society), to be implemented by a competition
agency with reinforced independence. However, anything more than a marginal
contribution to democratizing the political system, increasing judicial
independence, and ending corruption is too much to ask of even the most
resourceful competition agency. Unlike in the case of resource constraints,

61. Stephen Weymouth, Competition Politics: Interest Groups, Democracy, and Antitrust Reform in
Developing Countries, 61 ANTITRUST BULL. 296 (2016).
62. Interference with policies that seek to foster a culture of competition should be unlikely, because
such policies are much less immediately threatening to entrenched interests.
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skillful implementation of competition law and policy by itself cannot overcome
the problem.
C. Lack Of Competition Culture
Distrust toward—or at least anxiety regarding—market mechanisms is
common in many developing countries, and especially in countries that have only
recently transitioned from either a socialist or a capitalist-yet-state-dominated
economy to a market economy. Put differently, the normative commitment to
market competition as the fundamental principle of economic relations is in
many developing countries weak—among economic elites as well as in society at
large.
In developing countries where such a competition culture is lacking, many
scholars and practitioners consider it one of the most important impediments to
effective competition law and policy,63 even though it affects most of the
operationalized goals identified in part II only indirectly. The lack of a
competition culture can make it harder to find skilled economists and lawyers
committed to working for an agency whose mission it is to safeguard and foster
market competition. This in turn makes it more difficult to develop the capacity
to identify impediments to competitive markets, which undermines the first,
foundational step toward “unleashing rivalry,” as well as for an efficiencyoriented competition policy.
The lack of a competition culture also makes it less likely that competitors,
customers, and maybe suppliers will turn to the competition agency when they
encounter direct evidence—or apparent consequences—of suspected anticompetitive behavior. Such a lack of information from competitors and the
consuming public is likely to significantly impede the identification of anticompetitive conduct: Even the U.S. and EU competition agencies, with their
substantial staffs and sophisticated market-analytical capabilities, rely on formal
complaints or quiet tip-offs from competitors, customers and consumers, or
disgruntled former or current employees of firms engaged in anti-competitive
conduct for some eighty percent of their enforcement actions.64 A dearth of
supporting information-provision from private actors due to the lack of a
competition culture therefore can be expected to hamper—indirectly, yet
seriously—the goal of unleashing rivalry, as well as the pursuit of efficiency. To a

63. See, e.g., Allan Fels & Wendy Ng, Rethinking Competition Advocacy in Developing Countries,
in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 182, 183 (D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng & Ioannis
Lianos eds., 2013) (identifying the need to build competition culture in developing countries, and
advocating a national competition policy approach similar to the one taken in Australia); David Lewis,
Embedding a Competition Culture: Holy Grail or Attainable Objective?, in COMPETITION LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT 228, 230–235 (D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013) (arguing
for the need to promote competition culture in countries with new competition regimes, not just among
private actors but also within the government itself, based on experience of the South African
Competition Commission, whose success in its first decade in mergers and cartels was overshadowed in
its second decade by ministerial and judicial intervention into the Commission’s enforcement efforts).
64. Authors’ not for attribution interviews, Brussels and Washington, D.C.

INTRO (DO NOT DELETE)

11/29/2016 3:58 PM

No. 4 2016] COMPETITION LAW & POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

21

lesser extent it may also affect the implementation of a development-oriented
competition policy and of an advocacy-focused policy targeting the public sector
and policymakers.
The lack of a competition culture, moreover, may be expected to impede law
enforcement, possibly severely, because it makes it less likely that judges accept
the premise of the competition law, which in turn will impede the enforcementfocused pursuit of efficiency. A strategy aimed at unleashing rivalry is also likely
to suffer, because a lack of a competition culture reduces the probability that
potential competitors will actually enter the market when incumbent firms are
making supra-competitive profits.
The most severely detrimental consequence, however, is likely political:
Without deep-seated support for market competition, the “natural” constituency
for competition law—composed of groups such as consumers, and producers and
entrepreneurs facing high entry barriers from existing firms—does not form and
surely will not become vocal. The lack of a competition culture thus deprives the
competition agency of advocates and allies in society, which play a helpful
supporting role for the pursuit of any of the goals discussed in part II but will be
particularly critical if a competition law and policy is to be used to safeguard
political and economic freedom.
In sum, the lack of a competition culture is indirectly, but in important ways,
detrimental to the achievement of almost all of the goals of competition law and
policy. In addition, it directly affects competition culture as a goal, requiring
advocates of competition law and policy to create and nurture such a culture
rather than maintain and strengthen it.
The good news is that the lack of a competition culture also is a problem that
competition agencies can themselves help alleviate. They can do so through a
competition policy that puts advocacy (vis-à-vis society as much as vis-à-vis
government agencies) front and center and thus builds a competition culture—
and with it, a supportive political coalition, as Agüero shows in his analysis of the
development of the Chilean competition regime.65 Recognizing the importance
of building a competition culture, the World Bank and the International
Competition Network have recently started a joint program to highlight effective
competition advocacy programs to help agencies elsewhere learn from successful
advocacy efforts.66
D. Institutionally Underdeveloped Markets
Competition law and policy can only improve the performance of a market
economy if there actually is a market—a market that, absent anti-competitive

65. See generally Francisco Agüero, Chilean Antitrust Policy: Some Lessons Behind Its Success, 79
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016.
66. See WORLD BANK, THE 2015–2016 COMPETITION ADVOCACY CONTEST: HOW TO BUILD A
CULTURE OF COMPETITION FOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (Oct.
2015–Jan. 2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2015/10/30/the-2015-2016-competition-advocacycontest-how-to-build-a-culture-of-competition-for-private-sector-development-and-economic-growth.
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structures and conduct, is functional. Two types of contextual factors render
markets too dysfunctional to support an effective competition policy:
institutional deficiencies, discussed here, and market imperfections created by
geographical and other physical constraints, discussed in part III.E.
1. Weak or Poorly Enforced Property And Contract Rights
For goods and services to be traded in a market, it must be possible to
meaningfully transfer property rights from one person or firm to another.
Anything other than a spot transaction requires contractual commitments to be
meaningful, and therefore usually enforceable.67
2. Government Directing Economic Activity
Many developing countries’ economies do not work like true markets because
the state retains significant ownership stakes in a number of industries. The
government then uses this ownership to interfere politically in management
decisions or to direct economic activity to achieve various non-economic
objectives. Directly regulating competition among rivals through governmentsanctioned monopolies can have a similar effect, as can price controls for
industries that are not natural monopolies. For instance, the Mexican state
effectively organized and protected a cartel when its telecommunications
regulator ordered all Mexican carriers “to set their rates for calls entering Mexico
at the rate set by the largest firm,” Telmex.68
3. Exemptions From The Competition Law
An even more obvious institutional deficiency is created by categorical
exemptions of state-owned enterprises or government-sponsored monopolies
from the applicability of the country’s competition law.69 Other exemptions
remove specific industries or entire sectors (such as agriculture) from the
authority of the competition agency. In many Latin American countries,
economic activity equaling more than sixty percent of GDP is exempt from
antitrust enforcement through exemptions of nationalized strategic activities or
industries.70 In Mexico, for example, the constitution defines postal services,
petroleum and other hydrocarbons, nuclear energy and electric power, and other
sectors as “strategic” and therefore exempt from the application of the country’s

67. Contract enforcement can in principle be informal and communal. See AVNER GREIF,
INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE (2006).
But as Richman points out, communal enforcement is not compatible with fundamental principles of
competition law, such as the prohibition on collusive refusal to buy or sell (boycotts). Barak D. Richman,
Contracts and Cartels: Reconciling Competition and Development Policy, in COMPETITION LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT 155, 164–166 (D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013).
68. Fox & Healey, supra note 33, at 772.
69. See, e.g., Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa del Consumidor [Law for the
Promotion of Competition and Consumer Protection], No. 7474, art. 9 (1994) (Costa Rica).
70. IGNACIO DE LEON, AN INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LATIN
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 50 (2009).
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competition law.71 In other countries such as Colombia and Venezuela, activities
as diverse as agriculture, professional sports, labor organizations, and exports
have been exempted from antitrust laws.72 The larger the share of the country’s
economy affected by these exemptions, the less likely competition policy is to
have a notable effect.
Having institutionally under-developed markets reduces the chances of
competition policy attaining most of the objectives identified in part II, but it
affects some more than others. Institutional deficiencies such as the absence of
well-defined and readily enforceable property and contract rights should make
an efficiency-oriented competition policy particularly unattainable,73 whereas a
development-oriented competition policy need not be much impeded by having
the government direct some economic activity. By contrast, the chances of
unleashing rivalry in the private sector will be potentially severely diminished, at
least if institutional deficiencies create great uncertainty about the likelihood of
commercial success when entering a market, whereas an advocacy-focused
competition policy that seeks to establish a culture of competition may be
impeded but can still hold much promise. Similarly, we would expect a negative
effect on a competition agency’s ability to “unleash rivalry vis-à-vis the state”
through advocacy targeting elected officials and government agencies (as well as
on its ability to pursue a competition policy aimed at safeguarding political and
economic freedom) if market-based alternative solutions are less available or
attractive, but such an effect need not be severe.
Much also will depend upon how sweeping the exemptions are: If a country’s
competition law can be readily rendered inapplicable by being able to portray the
anti-competitive conduct in question as necessary due to any other law or due to
the actions of any government policy (“state action”), it may be hard for a
competition agency to make much headway. At the same time, this hardly
suggests the futility of competition law in some general sense, but rather should
alert us to the deficiencies in a given country’s market-governing rules as
interacting with the country’s competition regime.
E. Geographically Or Physically Underdeveloped Markets
Last but not least, many developing countries have underdeveloped domestic
markets due to size or geography, poor or limited physical infrastructure
connecting producers and consumers or traders, or climatic conditions that
prevent economic actors from using the existing infrastructure to create a single
domestic market.74

71. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Méxicanos, [CP] art. 28, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DOF] 03-02-1983, últimas reformas 20-12-2013.
72. DE LEON, supra note 70, at 56.
73. Working towards a culture of competition, if successful, should, collaterally, also increase
support for the strengthening of contract and property rights and would thus alleviate one of the
underlying problems over time.
74. Gal & Fox, supra note 49, at 307.
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Size can affect the effectiveness of competition policy in two ways. First,
domestic markets might have too few potential consumers for a given product or
service to work like a truly competitive market, even in the absence of anticompetitive conduct. Size here is partly a matter of numbers, but also a matter of
the level of economic activity. A country with a large but mostly poor population
still has only a small market for products for which there is no demand among
this population. This is why Gal advocates the small-country analogy as apt for
many markets in developing countries.75 Second, the size of the domestic market
affects enforcement efforts against international cartels and mergers. Foreign
firms can easily circumvent a small country’s penalties or conditions by simply
forgoing access to its market—a problem that motivates, in part, Ralf Michael’s
proposal in his article for this symposium.76
In sum, size matters. Even the most brilliantly executed competition policy
cannot by itself bring about significant improvements in efficiency if the market
is characterized by structural weaknesses. There also is not much room for
unleashing rivalry through purely domestic strategies in an economically “small”
country. The chances of competition policy achieving other goals seem much less
affected by the size of the market.
Size, however, is by no means the only pertinent geographic characteristic.
Neoclassical economics assumes away transportation costs (along with most
other transaction costs). But for anything except light-weight, high-value goods,
transportation costs still matter, both domestically and internationally.77 Time
and again in economic history, the transportation infrastructure has determined,
and often radically changed, the boundaries of markets.78 Today, innovations in
information and communications technology, along with new technologies such
as three-dimensional printing, promise to do the same again without the need to
transport physical goods.79 For the overwhelming share of most developing
countries’ economies, however, the extent to which consumers and producers are
connected by both transportation and communication infrastructures currently
remains critical to determining the extent of any market.
The feasibility of transport and communications is, at least in part, a function
of geography. Mountain ranges, deserts, oceans, and major rivers are formidable
75. See Michal S. Gal, Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement Challenges
Faced by Small and Developing Jurisdictions, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L. REV. 1, 12ff, 31–37 (2009).
76. See generally Ralf Michaels, Supplanting Foreign Antitrust, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4.
2016.
77. David Hummels, Transportation Costs and International Trade in the Second Era of
Globalization, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 131, 151 (2007) (showing that distance and variations in
transportation costs still explain a large share of countries’ bilateral trade volumes, even with the
significant decline in costs of air, land and ocean transport that are documented in the article).
78. See RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877–1900 (2000) (detailing the creation of a truly national economy in the United
States).
79. For a prescient perspective on these developments, see HOW REVOLUTIONARY WAS THE
DIGITAL REVOLUTION?
NATIONAL RESPONSES, MARKET TRANSITIONS, AND GLOBAL
TECHNOLOGY (John Zysman & Abraham L. Newman, eds. 2006).
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barriers to building a transportation infrastructure, often depriving a country of
a national market and dividing it instead into multiple, smaller jurisdictions.
Within the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, the left and right banks
of the Congo form practically unconnected economic spheres for hundreds of
miles, even though there is commercial traffic along the river.80 In Nepal, the
majority of the population is estimated to have few, if any, opportunities for
economic exchange beyond the local barter economy because the mountainous
geography of rural Nepal turns every valley into a largely separate economic
entity.81 Climatic conditions in many developing countries can similarly prevent
the maintenance of a national market: in countries as diverse as Bangladesh, The
Gambia, Kenya, Nepal, Sudan, and Nicaragua, for instance, a substantial share
of the country’s roads become unusable for part of each year with the onset of
rainy season.82
Do these characteristics of many developing countries’ markets constitute
insurmountable obstacles to an effective competition policy? Geography and
climatic conditions surely are hard to change, though even these factors are
usually less constraining for richer countries, which can afford an infrastructure
that makes their national markets much less likely to be meaningfully subdivided
by such conditions. And though the extent to which a country has an
infrastructure connecting its producers and consumers to each other by creating
a national-level domestic market is partly a function of resources, it also is a
matter of political priorities. Similarly, economic size is at least in part a political
choice rather than a given, as trade openness can greatly extend the size of the
market,83 especially when accompanied by domestic policies that help connect
80. See, e.g., Democratic Republic of Congo, in AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2005–2006 215,
223–225 (describing in some detail the “dilapidated or inexistent” transportation infrastructure of the
Democratic Republic Congo). The beginnings of the “reconstruction of infrastructure” have started in
recent years. See Country Notes: Congo, in AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2014: GLOBAL VALUE
CHAINS AND AFRICA’S INDUSTRIALIZATION 1f (2014); see also AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
OECD & UNDP, AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2015: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND SPATIAL
INCLUSION 76 (2015).
81. World Bank, Feature Story: Connecting Nepal’s Rural Poor to Markets (2009), https://www.
worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2009/12/17/connecting-nepals-rural-poor-to-markets [https://perma.cc
/KK42-E8R7] (describing how “Nepal’s rugged terrain prevent[s] people from moving with ease” with
“some 60% of [its] road network and most rural roads not operable during the rainy season”). For an
overview of the disparity of economic condition within the country, see NEPAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT
2014
11–24
(2014),
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/nepal_nhdr_2014-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DKQ2-PYS7].
82. See, e.g., José A. Barbero, Logistics Challenges in Central America, in GETTING THE MOST OUT
OF TRADE AGREEMENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 181, 199 (J. Humberto Lopéz & Rashmi Shankar eds.,
2011).
83. See generally SETH K. JOLLY, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE RISE OF REGIONALIST
PARTIES (2015) (showing how the highly institutionalized supra-national economic integration of the EU
has increased the viability of political movements for autonomy and “national” independence within
several of the member states of the EU); Alberto Alesina, Enrico Spolaore & Romain Wacziarg,
Economic Integration and Political Disintegration, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1276, 1277 (2000) (developing a
formal model that endogenizes the number and size of countries as a function of openness to trade);
David A. Lake & Angela O’Mahony, The Incredible Shrinking State: Explaining Change in the Territorial
Size of Countries, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 699, 719–20, (2004) (documenting and explaining the increase
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domestic producers and consumers to international markets—though it should
not be assumed that international integration of product or financial markets
alleviates, rather than exacerbates, problems that need to be addressed by
competition policy.84 In contrast to some of the other obstacles faced by
competition regimes, this cannot be alleviated by skillful competition regulators:
Competition law and policy themselves seem unlikely to affect the broader policy
priorities that are at issue here. That said, the impact of these obstacles on the
likely effectiveness of a development-oriented competition policy with its
primarily local focus, as well as on advocacy-based policies or on the benefits of
being attuned to concerns about political and economic freedom should be
modest. And where public policy shows a clear commitment to minimizing the
effects of these seemingly immutable constraints, competition policy may yet
hold much promise.
Table 1.2
Variation in Expected Detrimental Effect of the Impediments,
by Competition Law and Policy Goal/Objective
Efficiency

Development

Unleashing
Private

Unleashing
Public

Resource
Constraints

major

minor

minor

minor

Weak rule of
law; low
judicial
independence

major

Political
inequality
(formal or de
facto)

major

major

major

minor

Lack of a
competition
culture

major
(indirect)

minor
(indirect)

major
(indirect)

minor
(indirect)

major
(direct, but
surmountable)

minor
(indirect)

major

minor

minor

minor

major

minor

minor

minor

Institutionally
under developed
markets

major

Geographic/
physical
deficiencies of
the country’s
markets

major

minor

Culture of
Competition
minor

Freedom
major
(but
surmountable)

major

in the average size of states in the 19th and decrease in the 20th century).
84. For an overview, see Tim Büthe, The Politics of Market Competition: Trade and Antitrust in a
Global Economy, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 213 (Lisa L.
Martin ed., 2014).
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IV
EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN OUTCOMES (2):
POLITICAL SUPPORT AS A CONDUCIVE CONDITION FOR EFFECTIVE
COMPETITION POLICY
Variation in outcomes is not only explained by variation in the impediments
to competition policy effectiveness discussed in part III. It is also a function of
variation in conducive conditions, among which we believe the following three to
be particularly important, building on previous theoretical literature as well as
case studies. They are three distinct elements of the political context, in which
competition law and competition agencies operate.
A. Domestic Political Allies
The presence of domestic allies who are supportive of the competition agency
appears to have been an important factor in several successful cases. The
availability of such allies is in part a function of the country’s regime type. For
instance, democratization gives a voice to previously excluded groups such as
consumers and small businesses, who are natural allies for competition agencies’
efforts to curb the power of dominant economic actors that prevent newer firms
from entering into markets.85 In addition, a vibrant civil society can help a
competition agency succeed in safeguarding economic and political freedom,
establishing a culture of competition, and spurring rivalry in the private sector.
Non-governmental organizations—such as the India-based Consumer Unity and
Trust Society, and the Instituto Brasileiro de Estuos de Concorrência, Consumo
e Comércio Internacional in Brazil—for instance educate the public and
contribute to national debates on competition policy.86 A competition agency
may also find allies among other regulatory agencies and different parts of the
government and the bureaucracy when their interests coincide in pursuit of
regulating the country’s competitive process. Consumer protection agencies,
such as those in Mexico and Chile (where these agencies are separate from the
countries’ competition agencies), have aided competition law enforcement by
providing information to competition agencies or by bringing class action suits to
claim damages on behalf of consumers against dominant firms or cartel members,
thus augmenting the deterrent effect of fines imposed by the competition
agencies.87 Cooperative relations between different government agencies may
85. Weymouth, supra note 61, at 5.
86. Albert A. Foer, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development of
Competition Law, in MORE COMMON GROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 279, 287
(Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2009).
87. In México, PROFECO (Federal Attorney’s Office of Consumer) helped initiate an investigation
into a national poultry cartel by providing information it gathered through monitoring price levels in the
markets. See COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA, ANNUAL REPORT 2012 60 (2012),
http://189.206.114.203/images/stories/Publicaciones/Informesanuales/Annual_Report2012.pdf.
The
Chilean SERNAC (National Consumers’ Service) has sued the cartel members in both the pharmacies
and the poultry cartel cases. See Colusión de Medicamentos, SERNAC (Feb. 1, 2013),
http://www.sernac.cl/colusion-de-medicamenmtos-sernac-demanda-a-salcobrand-cruz-verde-y-
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also help avoid jurisdictional overlaps, conflicting mandates, and potential turf
wars, and allow agencies to draw on one another’s expertise.
B. International And Transnational Political Support
Political support from international and regional organizations may also help
boost a competition agency’s effectiveness in various ways. International
organizations such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
and the International Competition Network, provide competition agencies with
much needed resources and know-how on enforcement issues. The first two have
working groups focused on various aspects of competition law and its
enforcement. The third, a virtual network of competition agencies founded in
2001, aims to promote convergence among national competition laws and
enforcement practices.88 These three organizations hold regular fora for
competition agencies from all over the globe to share experiences and exchange
recommendations. They offer technical assistance to younger competition
agencies and provide opportunities for voluntary peer reviews of competition law
and its enforcement.89 These fora create peer groups that foster learning and
capacity building in younger agencies, and create pressure on them to build and
maintain a reputation as an independent, effective agency.90
Regional organizations can also positively influence the effectiveness of
competition policies within member states, prospective member states, and
associated countries, as illustrated by the European Union (EU). The EU
typically includes competition law provisions in its trade and association
agreements, and candidate countries have to adopt competition laws or modify
their existing laws to conform to EU legislation in this area.91 The adoption and
subsequent development of competition laws and policies in Central and Eastern
Europe was influenced significantly and, for the most part, positively by EU
membership negotiations.92 The conditionality of the competition provisions in
farmacias-ahumada-y-pide-compensa/ [https://perma.cc/F9YF-J4DG].
88. See Maria Coppola, ICN Best Practices: Soft Law, Concrete Results, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 2
(July 2011); Marie-Laure Djelic & Thibaut Kleiner, The International Competition Network: Moving
Towards Transnational Governance, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS
OF REGULATION 287, 287 (Marie-Laure Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson eds., 2006).
89. The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank also financially support various
national and regional projects in the area of competition policy, and foster research in this field.
90. For an insightful analysis of many aspects of the ICN’s operations, conceptualizing the ICN as a
“network of networks,” see Yane Svetiev, Partial Formalization of the Regulatory Network (Mar. 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1564890 [https://perma.cc/HP3B-HLWV].
91. See Umut Aydin, Promoting Competition: European Union and the Global Competition Order,
34 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 663, 673–674 (2012) (documenting how the EU has promoted the adoption of
competition laws in its neighborhood through accession and association agreements); Thomas J. Doleys,
Promoting Competition Policy Abroad: European Union Efforts in the Developing World, 57 ANTITRUST
BULL. 337, 340 (2012) (describing the EU’s efforts to export its competition law to developing countries,
and arguing that the scope of political-legal integration, and market dependence account for the variation
in outcomes).
92. Eleanor M. Fox, The Central European Countries and the European Union’s Waiting Room:

INTRO (DO NOT DELETE)

11/29/2016 3:58 PM

No. 4 2016] COMPETITION LAW & POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

29

the Customs Union Agreement of 1996 played a key role in the adoption of the
Turkish competition law, and membership negotiations have contributed to the
maturation of the Turkish competition authority.93 However, regional
organizations elsewhere have only recently gone beyond declamatory politics.94
And in the case of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, the
aspiration to establish the primacy of a supranational competition regulator
actually appears to have weakened existing competition agencies at the national
level, for example, in Senegal.95
Foreign support can be a double-edged sword, however. On the one hand,
such support may help alleviate impediments to agency effectiveness by
addressing issues such as lack of resources and expertise. International and
regional organizations may also serve as important external anchors for
competition policy reforms, which may otherwise be blocked by entrenched
interests, private or public. On the other hand, such foreign support may
reinforce the perception of competition law as a foreign import, and undermine
local receptiveness to such laws. Foreign support may also leave less room for
developing countries to devise competition laws that are more attuned to local
conditions—which, as Eleanor Fox argues in her contribution to this symposium,
is critical for ensuring that the competition law and policy serve the interests of
the country enacting it.96 Such laws also have a better chance of being enforced.97
Thus, while support from international and regional organizations has been key
to the effectiveness of competition law and policy in some developing countries,
there are also significant pitfalls to international involvement.
C. Embedded Autonomy Rather Than Formalistic Agency Independence
The independence of regulatory bodies has become a major issue in analyses
of governance and the evolution of the regulatory state.98 According to the
conventional wisdom, regulators as “agents” should be independent from elected
politicians as their nominal political “principals” in order to be able to pursue

Why Must They Adopt the EU’s Competition Law?, in COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN
EUROPE 31 (Saul Estrin & Peter Holmes eds., 1998).
93. See Umut Aydin & Kemal Kirisci, With or Without the EU: Europeanization of Asylum and
Competition Policies in Turkey, 18 S. EUR. SOC’Y & POL. 375, 386 (2013).
94. See generally, COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (Josef Drexl, et al. eds., 2011). A few regional bodies, such as COMESA, have since 2011
established competition agencies or at least moved from long unenforced competition rules toward the
beginnings of a real competition policy.
95. Mor Bakhoum & Julia Molestina, Institutional Coherence and Effectiveness of a Regional
Competition Policy: The Case of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, in COMPETITION
POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 94, at 96.
96. Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Policy: The Comparative Advantage of Developing Countries, 79
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016.
97. See Gal & Fox, supra note 49, at 303.
98. See, e.g., MARTINO MAGGETTI, REGULATION IN PRACTICE: THE DE FACTO INDEPENDENCE
OF REGULATORY AGENCIES (2012); Arndt Wonka & Berthold Rittberger, Credibility, Complexity and
Uncertainty: Explaining the Institutional Independence of 29 EU Agencies, 33 W. EUR. POL. 730 (2010).
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their assigned goals without distraction from conflicting agendas, and in
particular, to ensure that the principals cannot pressure them to abuse their
regulatory powers for short-term political gains of the elected politicians.99 In
addition, regulatory bodies need to be autonomous from those whom they
regulate to prevent capture by special interests.100 These arguments have been
particularly clearly articulated with regard to central bank independence. Even
though there are notable differences between central banks and regulatory
agencies,101 the core arguments in favor of central bank independence and
autonomy have been said to apply similarly to competition authorities.102 On the
empirical side, in addition to case studies supportive of the importance of agency
independence,103 there is statistical evidence that de facto independence of
competition agencies increases the perceived effectiveness of a country’s antimonopoly law or policy.104 Other analyses suggest that both de jure and de facto
independence of competition agencies leads to significantly higher total factor
productivity, as well as lower levels of corruption, in both developed and
developing countries.105
Does this imply that the optimal institutional arrangement is one that
maximizes agency independence? Notwithstanding the above arguments and
findings, the benefits of independence should depend on the strength of the rule
of law in the country (which is a hallmark of liberal democracy but should be
considered a distinctive institutional characteristic) and the strength of political
support for competition policy. Competition agencies thus might not need pure
independence or autonomy but rather something akin to what Evans, when
99. See, e.g., Daniel Y. Kono, Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency, 100
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 369 (2006) (discussing the incentives of elected political leaders to use regulations,
among other means, to provide rents to favored groups in a way that obfuscates political responsibility
for doing so at the expense of the general public).
100. For recent reviews of the theoretical literature and assessments of the empirical evidence of the
causes and consequences of regulatory capture, see PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel P. Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014);
Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203 (2006).
101. Fabrizio Gilardi, The Same, But Different: Central Banks, Regulatory Agencies, and the Politics
of Delegation to Independent Authorities, 15 COMP. EUR. POL. 303, 306 (2007) (arguing that while
delegation to central banks and regulatory agencies is similarly driven by concerns with credibility,
delegation follows a different pattern in each case, varying with the number of veto players as well as the
extent of political uncertainty).
102. John Vickers, Central Banks and Competition Authorities: Institutional Comparisons and New
Concerns 14–16 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 331, Nov. 2010).
103. E.g., Fred O. Boadu & Tolulope Olofinbiyi, Regulating the Market: Competition Law and Policy
in Kenya and Zambia, 26 WORLD COMPETITION 75, 82, 89 (2003) (suggesting that the stronger record of
the Zambian agency in controlling monopolies and economic power is due to the greater autonomy of
that agency).
104. Tay-Cheng Ma, Competition Authority Independence, Antitrust Effectiveness, and Institutions,
30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 226, 231 (2010).
105. See Stefan Voigt, The Effects of Competition Policy on Development: Cross-Country Evidence
Using Four New Indicators, 45 J. DEV. STUD. 1225, 1239–45 (2009). But see Mattia Guidi, The Impact of
Independence on Regulatory Outcomes: the Case of EU Competition Policy, 53 J. COMMON MARK. STUD.
1195, 1206 (2015) (finding no effect of agency independence on the levels of foreign direct investment or
consumer prices in European countries).
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discussing characteristics of the state that are conducive to adjustment and
economic growth, called “embedded autonomy.”106
We have reasoned that competition regulators often need to challenge not
only the anti-competitive practices of private-sector elites, but also the anticompetitive practices of state-owned enterprises and unnecessarily competitionrestricting laws and regulations. This reasoning arguably applies particularly
strongly in developing countries. It implies the need to take on entrenched
interests of private-sector elites, as well as entrenched interests within the
government and the state. Any agency to take on such an agenda on its own
would need to be extraordinarily powerful to stand a chance.107
Some form of autonomy from the political elite surely is a necessary element
of the competition agency’s power. However, an agency with such an ambitious
agenda cannot function effectively without political support.108 Agency budgets
are customarily subject to legislative approval; competition laws often require
adjustments, especially during the early years, to make them work in the local
context; legislative action is needed to keep fines meaningful in high-inflation
countries; and legislators and regulators in other parts of the executive branch
need to be responsive to the agency’s advocacy efforts. This dependence on other
political actors provides ample opportunity for pushback, which creates a need
for competition agencies to be embedded in the political system—to have
concrete ties that provide institutionalized channels for negotiation of goals and
policies109 and enactment of reforms.
Likewise, a competition agency’s total isolation from society is not desirable
either. Autonomy from concentrated and powerful economic interests is
necessary if the competition agency is to effectively enforce the law against such
interests. At the same time, the agency needs to make a sustained effort to
106. Peter Evans, The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural
Change, in THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT 139 (Stephan Haggard & Robert Kaufman eds.,
1992) (building on John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 195 (Stephen D. Krasner ed.,
1983)).
107. Indeed, the power of a regulatory agency able to take on such a broad swath of entrenched
interests would have to be so great as to be arguably incompatible with democratic governance. See Brian
Barry, Does Democracy Cause Inflation? Political Ideas of Some Economists, in THE POLITICS OF
INFLATION AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION 280 (Leon N. Lindberg & Charles S. Maier eds., 1985).
108. For a discussion of the challenge if not necessarily complete futility of trying to foster a
competition culture without political support, see, e.g., TONY A. FREYER, ANTITRUST AND GLOBAL
CAPITALISM, 1930–2004 (2006) (outlining the development of Japanese competition law and policy);
ELEANOR M. HADLEY & PATRICIA HAGAN KUWAYAMA, MEMOIR OF A TRUSTBUSTER: A LIFELONG
ADVENTURE WITH JAPAN (2003) (providing a more personal account of this historical development);
Marco Botta, Does the EU Competition Law Model Satisfy the Needs of the Emerging Economies?
Lessons from the Countries Without a ‘Carrot’ in FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EU
EXTERNAL RELATIONS 51 (Karolina Podstawa & Laura Puccio eds., 2012) (providing a comparative
analysis of the Argentinian and Brazilian competition regimes); see also Frédéric Jenny, Competition
Authorities: Independence and Advocacy, in THE GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW 158, 162
(Ioannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2012) (distinguishing between structural and operational
independence).
109. Evans, supra note 106, at 12.
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communicate with the public to gain and maintain a good understanding of
societal preferences and perceptions—and to explain to civil society in a clear
and persuasive manner the benefits of competition law and policy. The Mexican
Competition Commission, for instance, sees its sustained efforts to make the
public aware of the need for competition in the Mexican economy as essential to
preparing the ground for legislative changes that strengthened the country’s
competition law.110 An agency’s embeddedness in society is important for gaining
domestic political allies that generally help it succeed. It also might strengthen
enforcement efforts by improving the flow of information between the public and
the agency, and it might possibly even lead to better compliance with the law. As
both firms and the public at large learn more about cartels and their costs to the
society, for instance, public naming and shaming starts to become a stronger
deterrent against cartels.
IV
THE SYMPOSIUM: A PREVIEW
The symposium begins with a paper by Armando Rodriguez and Ashok
Menon on The Causes of Competition Agency Ineffectiveness in Developing
Countries.111 The article builds on their important book-length examination of
why the reality of competition law implementation and competition policy in
developing countries often falls far short of the ex ante promises and expectations
of policymakers and legal advisors.112 This disappointing performance arguably
is especially puzzling since the laws adopted by the new competition jurisdictions
often incorporate an impressive array of “best practices,” as defined by the
pioneers of competition law and policy among advanced industrialized countries.
Rodriguez and Menon’s article in this symposium, however, goes well beyond the
discussion of practical shortcomings of competition agencies’ enforcement
practices, which might explain the divergence between the theoretical strengths
of competition laws on the books and the reality of competition policy practice.
Specifically, Rodriguez and Menon argue that competition law and policy are in
the end more likely to do harm than good in the developing world. Markets in
developing countries, they caution, are very far from the optimal mechanisms for
the efficient allocation of values through arm’s-length transactions in neoclassical
economics. The deficiencies of market-supporting institutions—such as dearth of
trust, weak property rights, and lack of timely and independent administrative or
judicial contract enforceability—force market participants to rely on a variety of
non-market mechanisms to make economic exchange possible and not overly
risky. And what to Western or Northern antitrust analysts readily appear to be
anti-competitive structures (such as overly close relationships between private
sector firms and the state) or anti-competitive behaviors (such as price
110. Angel López Hoher, Competition Advocacy in Mexico: Lessons from the Past Decade, 2 CPI
ANTITRUST CHRON. 2–3 (2012).
111. Rodriguez & Menon, supra note 40.
112. See RODRIGUEZ & MENON, supra note 4.
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discrimination to the detriment of economic actors with whom the seller has no
established relationship) are in fact, Rodriguez and Menon argue, solutions to
deficiencies in market-supporting institutions, which are efficient in a Coasean
sense. Therefore, Rodriguez and Menon argue, competition agency interventions
against anything other than pure “hard-core” or “naked” private-sector cartels
will jeopardize or even choke off mutually beneficial economic exchanges rather
than yield gains in efficiency or any other legitimate objective of competition law
and policy.
Eleanor Fox’s consciously provocative article, The Comparative Advantage of
Developing Countries, contrasts with Rodriguez and Menon, offering a glass-halffull rather than a glass-half-empty perspective.113 Similar to Rodriguez and
Menon, she argues that OECD countries’ (and especially U.S.) “best practices,”
designed for well-functioning markets, are often ill-suited for new competition
jurisdictions in the developing world, which are trying to create market
competition in an environment of weak institutions and privileged, entrenched
market players that are often emanations of the state. But she challenges the idea
that developing countries are limited to a second-rate implementation of firstworld legal blueprints. Rather, she submits, new competition regimes in the
developing world actually have two advantages compared to the more
established regimes (even though they find themselves in the sea of handicaps).
First, not having the baggage of many years of antitrust, developing countries
have better incentives to design competition law and policy regimes that are welladapted to their own needs today. In the older regimes, existing laws and
enforcement agencies (and the interests that have grown up around them) make
institutional change path-dependent and efficient institutional adaption difficult.
New competition regimes in developing countries, by contrast, can (ceteris
paribus) design competition regimes suitable for their arguably distinctive goals,
including inclusive development and the need to foster rivalry vis-à-vis the state.
Second, because some of their most palpable harms arise from hybrid state and
private restraints at the border, they have better incentives to design and embrace
a supra-national framework that can help make markets work for them.
Whereas Rodriguez and Menon’s discussion is mostly categorical, Fox’s
argument suggests a conditional answer to the two key questions motivating this
symposium: She hypothesizes that success—especially with regard to the broader
objectives of developing countries’ competition laws—should be more likely the
more a country’s competition law (and its agency’s practices) represent a home-

113. Fox, supra note 96.
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grown adaptation rather than an adoption of a foreign template of Western best
practices.
William Kovacic and Marianela Lopez-Galdos, the authors of the third article
after this introduction, address the symposium’s central questions head-on,
developing a series of conditional answers, and exploring the factors that
contribute to the successful implementation of competition law principles across
a large number of competition regimes.114 In Lifecycles of Competition Systems:
Explaining Variation in the Implementation of New Regimes, Kovacic and LopezGaldos develop an argument about likely trajectories of competition regimes
over their first twenty to twenty-five years in existence, with a typology based on
three ideal-types. Based on meticulous primary research that included extensive
interviews with competition agency officials and other policymakers, as well as
years of participant observation by one of the authors, they identify the factors
that improve the prospects for effective implementation. They highlight—and
examine in much greater detail—several of the factors briefly discussed in this
introduction (such as funding, expertise, and political support, as well as generally
supportive collateral institutions) but they also go further. Based on a wealth of
original research across a large number of new competition regimes, Kovacic and
Lopez-Galdos find, for instance: Agencies that develop a general capacity and
specific tools for learning from their own and others’ experiences tend to get on
(or are able to switch to) a path toward effectiveness. Successful agencies tend to
assess their capacities periodically, and return to their national legislatures for
upgrades.
The article by Kovacic and Lopez-Galdos is followed by three separate singlecountry analyses, tracing the development of the competition regimes of Chile,
Mexico, and China, respectively. In Chilean Antitrust Policy: Some Lessons
Behind Its Success, Francisco Agüero explores how the Chilean competition
regime has evolved from a mostly ineffective system when it was established in
1959 to one of the success stories in Latin America.115 Agüero’s explanation for
the success of the Chilean competition regime emphasizes its embeddedness in
the political system, as well as a flourishing competition culture in the country.
Support from political parties across the ideological spectrum has enabled
legislative changes in 2003, 2009, and 2016, which have strengthened the Chilean
competition law and enforcement institutions—an illustration of the “upgrades”
discussed by Kovacic and Lopez-Galdos. The solid enforcement record of the
agency and the tribunal, as well as the publicity afforded by the recent discovery
of a number of cartel cases in key markets, have contributed to a flourishing
competition culture among economic actors and the society at large.
Like its Chilean counterpart, the Mexican competition regime is one of the
success stories in Latin America. It is the focus of Umut Aydin’s contribution to

114. Kovacic & Lopez-Galdos, supra note 5.
115. Agüero, supra note 65.
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this symposium.116 In Competition Law and Policy in Mexico: Successes and
Challenges, Aydin examines what allowed Mexico’s Federal Competition
Commission, after the mixed record of its first fifteen years, to become a
generally highly effective enforcement agency more recently. She argues that
both institutional learning and a series of legislative reforms were critical. And
those reforms were made possible by a domestic constituency supportive of
strengthening Mexico’s competition law, which included civil society actors,
competition lawyers, and firms trying to break into traditionally dominated
markets—a coalition consciously fostered by the Competition Commission itself.
International and transnational actors such as the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development and the International Competition Network also
aided the reform process with their expert assessments and recommendations, as
well as their political support to help convince the legislators of the need for
reforms.
In Competition Law Enforcement in China: Between Technocracy and
Industrial Policy, Yane Svetiev and Lei Wang explore the reasons behind the
success of the Chinese competition regime.117 Svetiev and Wang argue that
Chinese policymakers and enforcers have not blindly followed mature
competition regimes, but rather have incorporated domestic specificities and
policy concerns in drafting the law, designing the institutional structure for
enforcement, and making individual decisions—much like what Fox advocates
for developing countries’ competition regimes in general. In the face of
uncertainty about the role and possible effects of a competition instrument,
Chinese enforcers also sought and received considerable input from market and
civil society actors regarding their implementation of the Anti-Monopoly Law,
which has allowed them to incorporate multiple policy objectives besides
efficiency and consumer welfare. As a result, Chinese competition enforcement
is openly sensitive to a broader set of policy goals compared to the legal and
technocratic antitrust templates of mature jurisdictions. Such societal
contestation, according to Svetiev and Wang, both enlivens competition law in
the Chinese context and has the potential to deliver positive results along various
public policy dimensions, including developmental and distributional ones.
Though Chile, Mexico, and China, might all be considered successful cases, it
is unlikely that all countries will be able to establish effective competition regimes
at the domestic level. The final article in the symposium, Ralf Michaels’
Supplanting Foreign Antitrust, explores the contours of a competition law regime
that offers a substantial improvement if the status quo is having no “functioning
antitrust regime.”118 Specifically, Michaels examines under what conditions it is
desirable for the regulatory agency and courts of a country with a well-

116. Umut Aydin, Competition Law and Policy in Mexico: Successes and Challenges, 79 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4., 2016.
117. Yane Svetiev & Lei Wang, Competition Law Enforcement in China: Between Technocracy and
Industrial Policy, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016.
118. Michaels, supra note 76.
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functioning anti-cartel regime to exercise jurisdiction over cartels that have some
or even all of their effects in a country without such a regime—in the absence of
a treaty that might explicitly delegate jurisdiction and possibly even in the
absence of a request from the latter country’s government.119 After developing a
proposal that specifies the conditions that would need to be met for such
“supplanting” to be legitimate, Michaels works through three different scenarios
or constellations: A multinational cartel case, where an international cartel has
anti-competitive effects in at least one jurisdiction with a well-functioning
competition regime and at least one without such a regime; a transnational cartel,
where firms from one or more countries with a functioning competition regime
collude to the exclusive detriment of economic actors in a third country without
such a regime; and strictly “domestic” cartel cases, where the members of the
cartel, their anti-competitive actions, and those who are thereby harmed all
reside in a country without an effective competition regime. Only for the
“domestic” case do a number of possible objections hold, Michaels argues.120 In
sum, supplanting antitrust allows countries without an effective domestic
competition regime to deter anti-competitive behavior that is detrimental to its
citizens.

119. His analysis focuses exclusively on anti-cartel law and policy; parts may be applicable to other
competition issues, too, but Michaels explicitly brackets such an extension of his proposal.
120. Even here supplanting antitrust would be desirable if it took place with the consent of the
country where the harm occurred, though as a practical matter, Michaels suggests that supplanting is
virtually inconceivable under such conditions.

